How Much is Enough to Kill a Nation? Great Power Nuclear Deterrence in a New Era of Countervalue | Jaganath Sankaran
How Much is Enough to Kill a Nation? Great Power Nuclear Deterrence in a New Era of Countervalue | Jaganath Sankaran
Tuesday, October 7, 202512:00 PM - 1:15 PM (Pacific)
William J. Perry Conference Room
About the event: A fundamental premise of the nuclear revolution theory (TNR) is the claim of assured destruction—the ability of a state to retaliate with a nuclear second-strike that leads to the destruction of the adversary’s sociopolitical-economic-industrial infrastructure, denying it the ability to survive as a viable modern nation-state. However, as we enter an era of renewed strategic great power competition, emerging technological advances have reanimated questions about the continued relevance of TNR. Can a state employing emerging technologies significantly undermine the assured destruction capabilities of its adversary? Using insights and techniques from Self-Organized Criticality theory, Dr. Sankaran analytically reexamines and models the requirements for assured destruction. He demonstrates that the networked structure of critical infrastructures continues to make advanced industrial states extremely vulnerable to assured destruction—at a fraction of Cold War arsenal requirements. Dr. Sankaran argues that advanced industrial nation-states remain vulnerable to assured destruction retaliatory strikes.
About the speaker: Jaganath “Jay” is an associate professor in the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at The University of Texas at Austin and a non-resident fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. He works on problems at the intersection of international security and science & technology. Dr. Sankaran spent the first four years of his career as a defense scientist with the Indian Missile R&D establishment. Dr. Sankaran’s work in weapons design and development led to his interests in missile defenses, space weapons, nuclear weapons, military net assessment, and arms control.
The current focus of his research is the growing strategic and military competition between the major powers. In particular, Dr. Sankaran studies the impact of emerging technological advances on international politics, warfare, and nuclear weapons doctrine. His recent publications examine the impact of five technologies—small satellites, hypersonic weapons, machine learning, cyber weapons, and quantum sensing—on nuclear operations, strategic nuclear stability, and international security. His other recent publications have explored a multitude of national security issues, including the lessons for air power emerging from the Russia-Ukraine War, the politics behind the India-China border crises, and the influence of missile defenses on great power nuclear deterrence.
Dr. Sankaran has held fellowships at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, and the RAND Corporation. He has held visiting positions at the Congressional Budget Office’s National Security Division, the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) at the U.S. Air University, Tsinghua University, and the National Institute for Defense Studies (Tokyo). Dr. Sankaran has served on study groups of the National Academies of Sciences (NAS) and the American Physical Society (APS) Panel on Public Affairs examining missile defenses and strategic stability. Dr. Sankaran’s first book, “Bombing to Provoke: Rockets, Missiles, and Drones as Instruments of Fear and Coercion,” was published by Oxford University Press. He has published in International Security, Contemporary Security Policy, Journal of Strategic Studies, Journal of East Asian Studies, Asian Security, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Arms Control Today, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and other outlets. The RAND Corporation and the Stimson Center have also published his research.
All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.
No filming or recording without express permission from speaker.